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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SPANISH FORK WEST FIELD IRRI-
GATION COMPANY, a corpora- t 
tion, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents C N 
and Cross-Appellants, I ase o. 
8994 
THE UNITED ST ~~ES, a Nation, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
AND RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-APPELLANTS 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is the second time that this case has been before this 
Court on appeail. Heretofore the defendants, United States, 
a Nation, the Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of 
Reclamation of the United States, pursuant to Rule 72 (b), 
sought to have this Court direct the dismissal of this action 
upon the ground that the Court below, where the action was 
.1 
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pending, was without jurisdiction of either the . United· States 
or. the Secretary of the Interior or the Commissioner of Recla-
mation of the United States, and that each of them is an in-
dispensable party to this action. This Court denied the relief 
sought in such appeal. The same parties on this appeal are 
seeking identically the same relief that they unsuccessfully 
sought in the former proceeding before this Court. In the main 
the other facts recited in the Brief filed on behalf of the 
United States and its Interior Secretary and Commissioner -of 
Reclamation are correct, but the Respondents and Cross-
Appellants are not in agreement with the inference which 
said Appellants seek to draw from such facts, nor with the 
contention as to the law applicable thereto. 
ARGUMENT 
The Respondents contend: 
POINT I 
THAT THE APPELLANTS, UNITED STATES AND 
ITS SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND COMMISSIONER 
OF RECLAMATION ARE BOUND BY THE DECISION 
OF THIS COURT WHEREIN AND WHEREBY THEY 
WERE DENIED THE RIGHT TO HAVE THIS ACTION 
DISMISSED BECAUSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
The doctrine of Res Judicata, The Law of the Case and 
Estoppel by a judgment alike require that there be an end to 
litigation; that when a party has had an opportunity to litigate 
a matter he should not be permitted to litigate it again to 
the harassment and vexation of his opponent. 30 Am. fur., 
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Sec. 165 to 170, both inclusive, pages 911 ·to 914, ·and cases 
cited in the footnotes. It will be seen from the text and the 
cases cited in the footnotes that: 
"the doctrine of the 'law of th~ case' is akin to that 
of former ad judicati6n, but is more limited in the ap-
plication. It relates entirely to questions of law and 
is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings 
in the same case." 
See also: Black's Law Dictionary, Th~t·d Edition, page 
1076, and cases there cited. Among such cases is Grow v. 
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 47 Utah 26, 150 Pac. 670. 
It will be noted from the cases there cited that when the 
"Law of the Case" is applicable to a particular proceeding, 
it is binding alike on the trial court and the appellate court 
in any further steps or proceedings in the same litigation. 
While, as we recall, no written opinion was rendered by this 
Court when this case was before it in the former proceeding, 
such fact does not detract from the effect of the decision. 
Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, page 1347; Nampa 
Valley Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U.S. 355, 64 
L. Ed. 310, 40 Sup. Ct. Reports 74, where there is cited in 
support of the conclusion reached the cases of Calaf v. Calaf, 
232 U.S. 371; Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 
294, 299. It should be noted that the evidence received at the 
trial of this case does not add anything touching the matter 
of the jurisdiction of defendant, United States, and its Secretary 
of Interior and Commissioner of Reclamation, that was not 
apparent in the record before this Court at the time of the 
former proceeding. 
.3 
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In the event the Court should conclude that it may again 
review the question of whether or not the trial court had 
jurisdiction of the United States and its Secretary of Interior 
and Commissioner of Reclamation we shall again direct the 
attention of the Court to the authorities which support the 
conclusions that the court below had jurisdiction over such 
defendants. 
It will be noted from the index to the Brief filed on behalf 
of the Unietd States and its Secretary of Interior and Com-
missioner of Reclamation that more than fifty cases are cited, 
and in the cases so cited there are probably an equal number · 
of other cases cited. We shall not attempt an analysis of all 
of such cases. Many of the cited cases support doctrines that 
are so elementary that no useful·purpose will be served by a 
discussion of the same. Thus such cases as In Re Bear River 
Drainage Area, 2 Utah (2d) 208, 271 Pac. (2d) 846; United 
States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584; United States v. Shaw, 309 
U.S. 496; Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382; Belnap v. 
Schela, 161 U. S. 10; and other cases cited support the view 
that the United States may not be sued without its consent. 
Needless to say, we do not contend to the contrary. 
It is also urged that the Federal and State governments 
are divided into three departments, the legislative, the execu-
tive, and the judicial. See Brief of United States and its officers, 
pages 30 to 3 5. If the numerous cases there cited are for the 
purpose of convincing this Court that neither it nor the trial 
cou~t may properly exercise legislative functions, it would 
seem obvious that Counsel have needlessly devoted consider-
able effort in their search for cases which support a doctrine 
.4 
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with which the members of this Coqrt and the court below 
are, and ever since they were in the grade school, have been 
familiar. We have read the cases above referred to, but as we 
read them, they shed little, if any, light on the questions 
here presented. In our view, as we shall presently point out, 
the errors committed by the trial court are in the improper 
construction of the contracts which plaintiff sought to have 
construed, and not in the trail court infringing upon the func-
tions of the legislative branch of government. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW HAD AND THIS COURT HAS 
JURISDICTION OVER THE UNITED STATES. 
Respondents and Cross-Appellants do, as assumed by 
Appellants, rely upon the following Acts of Congress: 
'Consent is hereby given to join the United States as 
a defendant in any suit ( 1) for the adjudication of 
rights to the use of water ·of a river system, or other 
source, or ( 2) for the administration of such rights, 
where it appears that the United States is the owner 
of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by ap-
propriation under state law by purchase or exchange 
or otherwise and the United States is a necessary party 
to such suit. The United States, when a party to any 
such suit shall ( 1) be deemed to have waived any right 
to plead that the state laws are inapplicable or that the 
United States is not amendable thereto by reason of 
its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judg-
ments, orders and decrees of the court having jurisdic-
tion, and may obtain review thereof in the same manner 
and to the same extent as a private individual under 
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like: circumstances; Provided, That no judgment for 
costs shall be entered against the United State~ in any 
such suit." · · 
The foregoing statute should be given a liberal construction 
so that its purposes will be accomplished. Bank v. King1 142 
Fed. Supp. 1 at 80; Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 248; 
Canadian A't4iation v. United States, 324 U. S. 215 at 222; 
United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 350. 
It is the contention of the Respondents and Cross-Appel-
lants that this proceeding is fully authorized by the law above 
quoted. The United States and its defendant officers concede, 
as they must, that they are necessary parties to this suit, in that: 
the United States is the owner of the project, subject, of course, 
to the rights of those who have purchased a water right. 
It is argued that this is not a suit for the adjudication 
or administration of a water right. The pleadings and the 
evidence shows that this action is brought for both purposes. 
It will be seen that the Petition for a Declaratory Judgment 
alleges in detail the facts ripon which plaintiffs seek the relief 
prayed. It is alleged in paragraph 1 of the Petition that each 
of the plaintiff corporations is and for more than sixty years 
has been engaged in operating an irrigation system and de-
livering water to its stockholders and other water users who 
have purchased water from defendant, United States (R. 5). 
Similar allegations are made in paragraph 9 as to the defendant, 
Spanish Fork Southeast Irrigation. Company, the Clinton Irri-
gation Company, the Salem Canal and Irrigation Company, 
and the Strawberry High Line Canal Company (R. 6). 
In paragraph 11 of the Petition it is alleged that defendants 
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the Springville· Irrigation -District and- the Mapleton Irrigation 
District have each purchased ~ water -right from ·the United 
States. The amounts of each such puq::hase and the pri~e to 
be paid therefor is set out in paragraph 33 and 34' of the 
Petition (R. 7). The quantity of water right purchased by 
Spanish Fork City is set out in paragraph· 36 of the Petition, 
and the amount of water purchased by Payson City is set out 
in paragraph 3 7 (R. 16). In Paragraph 38 is set out the 
total quantity of water right purchased from defendant, United 
State, by the various parties to this proceeding. 
In paragraph 23 it is alleged that in 1906 defendant, 
United tSates, filed with the State Engineer an Application 
to appropriate a flow of 156 cubic feet per second throughout 
the year for the generation of electricity, and in paragraph 24 
it is alleged that on February 4, 1909, by the Bureau of Recla-
mation defendant, United States, filed an Application with the 
State Engineer of Utah to appropriate 300 cubic feet per second , 
of the unappropriated water of Spanish Fork River, and that 
in 1914 it filed another Application to appropriate an additional 
flow of 100 cubic feet per second of the water of Spanish 
Fork River. 
In paragraph 25 of the Petition it is alleged that the fol-
lowing parties to this proceeding are entitled to a flow of the 
following quantities of the water of Spanish Fork River, and 
that the same is superior to the water which defendant, United 
States, has appropriated of the waters of Spanish Fork River: 
East Bench Canal, 95 cubic feet per second; 
Salem Canal & Irrigation Company, 55 cubic feet per 
second; 
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Spanish Fork South Irrigation Company, 75 cubic feet per 
second; 
Lake Shore Irrigation Company, 60 cubic feet per second, 
and 
Spanish Fork City, Spanish Fork Southeast Irrigation Com-
pany, and Spanish Fork West Irrigation Company, 105 cubic 
feet per second. . 
Making a total flow of 390 cubic feet per second. 
In paragraph 10 of the Petition it is alleged that in about 
1926, defendant, Strawberry Water Users Association, was 
organized as a corporation, and that since its o~ganization has 
been engaged in the care, operation and maintenance of a 
Federal Project known as the Strawberry Valley Project and 
all appurtenances thereunto belonging, except the irrigation 
systems of defendants Mapleton and Springville Irrigation 
districts, and the Strawberry High Line Canal, a corporation, 
but that such care, operation and control of such Strawberry 
Valley Project is subject to the supervision of defendants, 
Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Reclamation of the United States (R. 7). 
In paragraph 39 of the Petition it is alleged that:· 
"It is provided in the Articles of Incorporation of 
the Strawberry Water Users Association that the area 
irrigated by the water from the Strawberry project is 
divided into 16 districts and that a director is to be 
elected from each district" 
and that as a result of such provision the owners of contracts 
for water deliverable through the Strawberry High Line Canal 
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always have a majority of the Board of Directors of said Asso-
ciation, and, therefore,· control its policy (R. 17). 
In paragraph 40 of.the Petition it is alleged that ever since 
the Strawberry Water Users Association took over the control 
of the Strawberry Project its Board of Directors have claimed 
the right to determine from year to year the amount of water 
that each purchaser of water from the United States is entitled 
to receive pursuant to his contract of purchase, and particularly 
does the Board of Directors of the Strawberry Water Users 
Association claim the right to determine the amount of charges 
that shall be ·made against the users of water deliverable 
through the High Line Canal from the flow of Spanish Fork 
River water (R. 17). 
In paragraph 48 of the Petition it is alleged that petitioners 
are informed and believed that all of those . who are parties 
to the proceeding have an interest in the subjectmatter of this 
controversy, and that all parties who have an interest in such 
subjectmatter, are made parties either by expressly being made 
so, or by those parties who are expressly named parties for 
themselves, and all other persons similiarly situated (R. 22). 
Plaintiffs in their Petition prayed judgment that those who 
had purchased water from the United States be charged with 
all the wtaer that they used, except as they may show some other 
or additional water right, that the Court make a provision for 
those who do not use all of the water stored in the reservoir 
in any given year may use the same the following year with an 
allowance for evaporation not to exceed 25% thereof. That 
no part of the 156 second feet of river water appropriated 
for the generation of power be used for irrigation of lands 
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under the Strawberry High Line Canal without paying to the 
Strawberry Valley Project the costs that may be incurred by 
reason of being deprived of the use of such water for generating 
electric power; that the Court enter an appropriate decree to 
insure a compliance with determination as prayed; that the 
Court make such other and further order and decree as is just 
and proper, and that petitioners be awarded their. costs (R. 
23-24). 
During the trial of this case defendants were very much 
opposed to permitting any water user to receive credit in a 
subsequent year for any water that he might leave in the 
reservoir during any given year, and plaintiffs stated to the 
Court that they would abandon such request (R. 434). 
It was also made to appear during the trial that there was 
no controversy concerning the matter of the obligation of those 
who used water for irrigation that was appropriated for gene-
ration of power should pay for the water which was needed for 
the generation of electricity (A. 503). 
The Court below found as facts substantially all of the 
allegations above stated. In paragraph 60 of its Findings of 
Fact it found that all of the parties who had any interest in 
the waters of the Project \vere parties to the proceeding. No 
attack was made in the court below upon the propriety of 
such finding. Nor was any suggestion made as to anyone who 
was not a party to the proceeding, either in person or by right 
of representation. That being so, Appellant United States and 
its Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of the Bureau 
of Reclamation may not be heard to raise that question for 
the first time on appeal. 
10 
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We have in some detail directed attention. to the pleadings 
filed and _the- Findings made in the court below- because the 
same show thatsuch Court· had jurisdiction of both the subject-
matter and the parties to this proceeding. 
The parties are agreed. that the United States_ acquired 
its right to the use of the water here involved by filing with 
the State Engineer an Application to appropriate the same. 
Pursuant to the filing of such Application and putting the 
water applied for to a beneficial use, the United States acquired 
its right to the use of the water which was stored . in the 
reservoir and of the water of Spanish Fork River. The nature and 
extent of the right of the purchaser of a water right from . the 
United States is of necessity fixed by. the contract of purchase. 
The only way of securing a determination of the rights of such 
purchasers is to obtain a construction of the contracts of pur-
chase. That is what is sought by this proceeding. 
It is quite true that the Federal Declaratory Act does not 
of itself authorize suit against the United States. The same 
may be said of any act, except an Act of Congress. However, 
when Congress has authorized suit against the United States 
Government, the Declaratory Judgment Act may properly be 
used as the remedy to accomplish the purpose of securing an 
adjudication of water rights as well as for the administration 
of such rights. That is the effect of the holding of the cases 
from other jurisdictions cited by Counsel for the United States 
and its Secretary of the Interior and Commisisoner of the 
Bureau of Reclamation, among which are Brownell v. Ketchan 
Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 Fed. (2d) 121; Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Quarles, 92 Fed. (2d) 32. That is the express holding of 
11 
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this Court in the case of Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. 
(2d) 251, and its sequel reported in 107 Utah 272, 153 Pac. 
( 2d) 544. It should be· kept in mind that under the· Act of 
Congress, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 666, it is the law of the state where 
the river system or other source is situated that is controlling, 
and not the law of some other state. 
There is cited in the Brief of the United States and its 
Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Reclamation a number of cases from other jurisdictions to the 
effect that only parties to the suit are bound thereby, and that 
all parties to an adjudication of wtaer rights in which the 
United States is a party must be joined in this action. It is not 
clear just what bearing such cases have on this case. We cer-
tain! y are not here contending that anyone not a party of this 
action is bound thereby. The Declaratory Judgment Act of Utah, 
U.C.A. 1953, 78-33-11, provides that: 
''When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall 
be made parties who have or claim any interest which 
would be affected by the declartion and no declaration 
shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the 
proceeding.'' 
As we have heretofore pointed out, it is alleged in the 
Petition and found by the Trial Court that all of the parties 
interested in the subjectmatter of this litigation are parties 
thereof. 
It seems to be the contention of Counsel for the United 
States and its Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of 
Bureau of Reclamation that an action for adjudication of 
water rights in which the United States may be made a party 
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must be brought under what is. generally referred- to as a 
general adjudication as provided in U.C.A. 1953, Title· 73, 
Chapter 4. It may be that. a proceeding for the determination 
of water rights may be maintained against the United ··States 
in conformity with the provisions of the Act just mentioned, 
but there is nothing in that Act which indicates that the only 
way of securing a general adjudication of water rights is pur-
. ···suant to the provisions of such Act. 
The case of Gray v. Defa, supra, is to the contrary, as are 
also some of the other cases cited in the Brief of the United 
States and itsOfficers. Indeed, it is not certain that the general 
adjudication statute above mentioned may be successfully fol-
lowed where, as here, it is sought to secure a judgment pro-
viding for the administration of water rights. See Smith v. 
District Court, etc~, et al., 69 Utah 493, 502, 256 Pac. 539, 542. 
Counsel for the United States and its Secretary of the 
Interior and Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation seem 
to get some comfort out of such cases as Lynn v. United States, 
10 Fed. (2d) 586, 588; New Mexico v. Backer, 199 Fed. (2d) 
426, 428; 0 gden River Water Users Assn. v. Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy District, 238 Fed. ( 2d) 936, and other 
cases and authorities cited on pages 24 to 2 7 of their Brief. 
Those cases in effect hold that the courts may not lawfully take 
over the control of dams, reservoirs and facilities of a Federal 
Project. There is nothing in the pleadings, the evidence, the 
Findings, or the Decree in this case which is calculated to ac-
complish any such results. 
Plaintiffs alleged in paragraph 25 of the Petition that 
pursuant to contract had with the United States the following 
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corporations had a prior right to a flow of the waters of 
Spanish Fork · River: 
Spanish Fork East Bench Canal Company ____________ 95 c.f.s. 
Salem Canal & Irrigation Company -----~-------------- 55 c.f.s. 
Spanish Fork South Irrigation Company ____________ 75 c.f.s. 
Lake Shore Irrigation . Company -------------------------- 60 c'.f.s. 
Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Company ____ 105 c.f.s. 
TotaL------------------------------------------------------390 c.f.s. 
and that the water had been distributed in conformity with the 
foregoing agreement ever since the Federal Government has 
claimed a right to some of the waters of Spanish Fork River 
(R. 423). 
In the Answer of the United States and its Officers, they 
at first admitted the allegations paragraph 25 of the Peti-
tion (R. 109). See paragraph 15 of their Answer (R. 109). 
The other defendants in paragraph 16 of their Answer also 
admit the allegations of paragraph 25 of the Petition (R. 99). 
It was not until late in the trial that defendants raised any 
question about the comp~nies above mentioned being entitled 
to a prior right to a flow of 390 c.f.s. per second (Trs. 426, 
et seq.) Over objection of Counsel for plaintiffs, the Court 
permitted the answer of the United States and its Officers 
to be amended so as to deny that the various companies had 
the priorities to the flow of the waters in Spanish Fork River 
above mentioned (Tr. 441). The other defendants asked 
leave to make the same amendment to their Answer (Tr. 442). 
After the Court permitted the amendments above mentioned 
Counsel for numerous of the defendants asked leave to with-
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draw as Counsel for some· of the defendants, ;and stated· that 
they were not making a denial on behalf of the defendants 
for whom they withdrew as Counsel. ·The basis for the with-
drawal was that there would probably be a conflct of interest. 
Counsel for the following corporations and their officers 
were, by leave of Court, permitted to withdraw as their Counsel: 
Spanish Fork Southeast Irrigation Company; Clinton Irrigation 
Company; Spanish Fork City, Salem Canal & Irrigation Com-
pany, and others (Trs. 445 to 45 7). 
In its Order permitting Counsel to withdraw the Court 
further stated that if the issues a~ to the relative rights of the 
United States and the old rights in Spanish Fork River were 
determined adversely to the claims of plaintiffs, the other 
~efendants who have heretofore been represented by Counsel, 
who have now withdrawn as their Counsel, will be given an 
opportunity to offer evidence in support of their claim (Trs. 
456-7). Thereupon Counsel for plaintiffs were granted leave 
to reopen the case. Evidence was offered which showed that 
ever since the United States made its filings on the water 
of Spanish Fork River, all of the parties who claimed rights 
in the water of such River had recognized and distributed 
the waters of Spanish Fork River upon the basis that the above 
mentioned corporations have a prior right to a flow of 390 
c.f.s., and that such companies have beneficially used the same 
whenever it has been available (Trs. 458-476 and Trs. 525-
546). 
As we have heretofore called the attention of the Court 
to the fact that· the pleadings, the evidence and the Findings 
of fact made by the court below are all to the effect that all 
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of the parties interested ·in the water ·of Spanish Fork River 
were before the Court, while Counsel for. defendant United 
States seem to contend to the contrary, they fail to point out 
any facts in support of such contention. They also assert this 
is not a class action, but fail to point out any defect in the 
pleadings in support thereof. Of course, near the close of the 
action when Counsel for defendants asked to amend their plead-
ings and Counsel for some of the defendants withdrew as 
their attorney, some of the defendants were without Counsel. 
However, the Court ordered that if the case should go against 
them, they would be given an opportunity to be heard. So 
far as appears, they are satisfied with the judgment. The 
pleadings, the evidence and the Findings of the Court show 
that this is a typical class action. 
It is the uniform practice in this state to bring the action 
against a corporation as the means of binding all of its stock-
holders. That is made apparent in this action. In the Petition 
filed herein all of the corporations who, as such, have an 
interest in the waters of Spanish Fork River have been made 
parties to this action, as have also a number of stockholders 
of the corporations who are also owners of contracts for the 
purchase of a water right from the United States. There will 
be found in the record numerous interrogatories submitted 
by defendants in conformity with Rule 33 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, from which it is made to appear from the 
answers given that the personal plaintiffs are owners of. con-
tracts to purchase water rights from the United States. It is 
also made to appear from the pleadings and the Findings of 
the Court that the stockholders of the Strawberry High Line 
Canal are the owners of 40,377.26 acre feet of water deliver-
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able annually through that canal. Paragraph 38 of the Peti-
tion (R. 16). 
In paragraph 27 of the Answer of the United States and 
its Officers the allegation of paragraph 38 are admitted, but 
allege that there is additional water not included in paragraph 
38. The evidence shows that the High Line Canal Company 
does not have any water other than the sum of the water 
purchased by the various persons who have their water delivered 
through that canal (R. 347). 
During the course of the trial Counsel for the Government 
and other defendants took considerable pains to point out 
that not all of the contracts were the same, in that: some of 
the contracts did not expressly provide for a maximum of 2 
acre feet per year. All of the personal contracts, except one, 
that were for river water deliverable through the Strawberry 
High Line Canal make the total of the water deliverable 
through such Canal 40,377.26 acre feet per annum. Paragraph 
38 of the Petition, (R. 16), paragraph 27 of the Answer of 
the United States and its officers, (R. 110), paragraph 26 of the 
other defendants, Testimony of Mr. Hub~r, Secretary of Straw-
berry Water Users Association, (Tr. 162); Findings of Fact 
No. 47 (R. 432) are to the same effect. If , as it appears 
from the Brief filed in behalf of the United States, it is con-
tended that each and all of the holders of a contract for the 
purchase of a water right from the United States should be 
made a party to this suit in order to give the court jurisdiction 
of this cause, then, if that be claimed, such claim is not sup-
ported by the law. The purchases of water deliverable through 
the Strawberry High Line Canal are apparently stockholders 
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of that corporation;· or if not, a number of .the parties who 
received water through that Canal were made· parties to this 
action for themselves and others who received water through 
that Canal. No useful purpose could be accomplished by a 
decree showing the quantity of water that each was entitled 
to receive. So far as appears there was no controversy with 
respect thereto. When, as here, the pleadings, the evidence, the 
Findings and the Decree fixed the total amount of water that 
the owners of water contracts under the High Line were 
entitled to receive, the requirements of a suit to establish 
the rights of the parties to this action were fully complied 
with. Rule 23 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Haugh v. 
Porter, 51 Ore. 318, 98 Pac. 1983. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW AND THIS COURT HAS JURIS-
DICTION OVER THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND 
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAMA-
TION. 
On pages 27 of the Brief filed on behalf of the United 
States and its officers, it is argued that the Court is without 
jurisdiction over the Seqetary of Interior because of the broad 
powers granted him by Congress and because he resides in 
Washington D.C., and must be sued at the place of his resi-
dence. If that be the law, the provisions of 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 
666, is a nullity. This is an action in rem or quasi in rem and 
as such must be brought where the subjectmatter of the action 
is situated. It would indeed be a novel and, so far as we are 
able to ascertain, an unheard of procedure to bring an action 
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in .)Vashi11gton, D.C., tq have determined the rights to. the 
use o_f water in IJtah and "for ;the ~d.tninistratigq of s_U(:h 
righ~s!" U.Cr.A. 1953, . 73-?-.l provides, among other, rp.atters: 
·"He (State Engineer) shall have general administta.-
tive. supervision of the waters of the state, and of the 
measurement, appropriation, apportionment and dis-
tribution thereof. He shall have power to make and 
publish such rules and regulations as may be necessary 
· from time to time to carry out the duties of his office, 
. and particularly to secure the equitable and fair appor~ 
tionment and distribution of the· waters according to 
the respective rights of appropriation." 
No claim is made, and th-ere is nothing in the Decree entered 
in this case, which gives to the State Engineer ~ny · authority 
to regulate the water which is stored in the reservoir. The 
controversy is with respect to the water of Spanish Fork River, 
some of which was many years ago appropriated by the stock-
holders of. the corporate parties to this action, and some of 
which was recently appropriated by the United States Gov-
ernment. When Congress provided for the administration of 
the rights of the water in which the United States has an interest 
according to state law, such provision of necessity must be 
by the State Engineer. But assuming, contrary to our conten-
tions, that the Strawberry Water Users Association acting for 
the Secretary of the Interior has the right to regulate the 
apportionment and distribute the water of Spanish Fork River, 
still it may not perform such functions as suits its whims. 
It will be observed that the contracts of those who purchased 
a water right under what is characterized as the Spanish Fork 
Unit contains a provision fixing the quantity of water that 
is applied for "and in no case exceeding the share propor-
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tionate to the irrigable acreage of the water supply actually 
available or determined by the Project manager or other proper 
officer of the United States, or its successor, in control of tne 
project during the irrigation season for the irrigation of lands 
under said unit" (Exhibit 47). Substantially the same provision 
'is contained in the contracts designated as the High ·Line Unit. 
In such contracts it is provided that the amount of water 
delivered in any given year shall not exceed 2 acre-feet per 
year (Exhibit 8). 
If, as appears from the argument of Counsel for the.de-
fendants, the Court may not alter the contracts for the purchase 
of a water right from the United States, for stronger reasons 
the Board of Directors of the Strawberry Water Users Asso-
ciation may not alter such contracts. At least, the tr~al court 
had no interest in this controversy, while the majority of the 
Board of Directors of defendant, Strawberry Water Users 
Association, are directly interested in securing more water 
than is called for in the contracts, which provide for delivery 
of water through the High Line Canal. They have not hesi-
tated to demand, and pursuant to such demarid, have received 
additional water with no charge, or at most only a nominal 
charge for the same. We agree that the trial court was without 
authority to amend the contracts, and for stronger reasons 
the Board of Directors of defendant, Strawberry Water Users 
Associatoin, is without such authority. We shall have more 
to say about this phase of the case when we come to discuss 
the Brief of the other defendants. 
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POINT IV 
THE ACTION SHOULD NOT ,BE DISMISSED, BUT 
SHOULD BE AMENDED TO COMPLY WITH THE EVI-
DENCE. 
On page 28 of the Brief of the United States and its 
Officers, it is argued that the action should be dismissed, 
especially because of the paragraphs 13 through 16 of the 
Decree. In light of the fact that most of the provisions of 
paragraphs 13, through 16 were repeatedly and vigorously 
urged upon the Court below by the defendants who succeeded 
in having the Court adopt the same over the objections of 
plaintiffs, it ill behooves them to now urge that the Court 
should not have ruled with them on such matters. 
It is, of course, elementary law that one may not be heard 
to complain before an appellate court upon matters which 
the party complaining succeeded in inducing the lower court 
to rule with such complaining party. 5 C.J.S., Sec. 1501, pagu 
857, and cases cited in footnotes. 
POINT V 
THE APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM COM-
PLAINING BECAUSE THE COURT MADE PROVISION 
FOR RETAINING JURISDICTION TO THE PURPOSE OF. 
MAKING FUTURE CHANGES IN THE DECREE. 
We are agreed with Appellants that the trial court erred 
in retaining jurisdiction of this cause for a period of ten years, 
and we commend them for coming to this conclusion, which 
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is ·in accord with· the contention of the Respondents in the 
court below. 
We shall reserve further discussion of this· phase of the 
case until we consider our Cross-Appeal. 
POINT VI. 
Beginning on page 46 and continuing to the end of the 
Brief of the United States and its Officers, it is contended that 
the Court should not have interferred with the practice that 
has prevailed since the United States turned the control of 
the project over to the Strawberry Water Users Association. 
The evidence shows without conflict that during thirteen of 
the years since the control of the project has been turned over 
to the Board of Directors of the Strawberry Water Users Asso-
ciation plaintiffs, who have purchased a water right from the 
United States, have been deprived of the use of a part of the 
water which they purchased. On page 7 of the trial Court's 
Memorandum of Opinion will be found an analysis of the 
amount of_ water available for use during various years, and 
the charges for river water that was made against the water 
users under the High Line Canal. During the time the Gov-
ernment had control of the project the parties who received 
the water purchased through the established irrigation systems 
were supplied with the full amount purchased. Since the Board 
of Directors of the Strawberry Water Users Association have 
been in control as little as 3 5% has been received by such 
purchasers. The water users who have purchased water de-
liverable through the High Line Canal have been charged 
less and less for the river water used by them. During the 
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period of 1939 to 1955~ both years inclusive,: the :average,' rate 
of charge ·'for such water used by those who receive water 
throllgh the High Lin(;! Canal w~s only 15.5. See E;xhibits 69 
and 73. It' requires no argument to show that· if the ~sers of 
such water are charged for all of the water they use, there 
will be more water· in the. reservoir for the use of those who 
received their water through the established irrigation systems. 
It is argued that the project as a whole will be benefitted by 
the method followed by the Board of Directors of the Stntw-
berry Water Users Association even if it results in depriving 
the users of water under the old established irrigation systems 
of some of the water they have purchased. That is the same 
argument that is made by those who would take property 
from those who have and give it to those who have not. The 
law has not yet approved such doctrines, and until . it does 
the courts are not empowered to so decree. Nor is the doctrine 
that one may be a judge in a case where he has a direct financial 
interest that will be enhanced, met with approval. In this case 
the evidence shows without conflict that a rna jority of the Board 
of Directors of the Strawberry Water Users Association will 
be and are being benefitted by making a small charge for 
river water delivered to them through the High Line Canal. 
So far as we are able to ascertain no appellate court should 
or has put its stamp of approval upon such a procedure. 
POINT VII 
CORRECTION OF PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF 
DEFENDANTS, STRAWBERRY WATER USERS ASSOCI-
ATION, ET AL., AND STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL 
FACTS OF CONTROLLING IMPORTANCE. 
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The plaintiffs, who are Respondents and Cross-.Appellants, 
have been served with three sets of Briefs, which makes it 
necessary for them to, in effect, file three Briefs in answer to 
the various arguments made by the three sets of Appellants. 
We shall, however, attempt to avoid needless repetition. These 
arguments made so far are applicable. and intended to apply 
to each of the three sets of Briefs. 
In the main the statements of· the facts contained in the 
various Briefs are correct so far as they go, but in at least one 
important particular the statements are in error. 
On page 4 of the brief of Strawberry Water Users Asso-
ciation it is said: 
.. During the course of the trial the trial court indi-
cated that it was going to adjudicate in this proceeding 
the relative collective rights between plaintiffs and de-
fendants to the use of the waters of Spanish Fork 
River (Tr. 425-457, incl.) Up until this point defend-
ants had proceeded on the basis that this action was 
limited to an interpretation of the water Contracts 
(Tr. 442-445, 446). When the Court took the view 
that it was going to ~d judicate the relative collective 
rights to the use· of the waters of the Spanish Fork 
River, (Tr. 447}, a conflict of interest between some 
of the defendants represented by the firm of Christen-
son, Novak and Paulson arose, and it became necessary 
to withdraw as Counsel for some of the defendants. 
(Tr. 450.)" 
As to that phase of the case, this is what transpired. In para-
graph 25 of the Petition (R. 10), it is alleged that the various 
canals of the Corporations who have a right to the use of 
waters of Spanish Fork River: 
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were filled to capacity with water from Spanish 
Fork River and measurements taken of such flow, and 
thereupon contracts were entered into with each of 
such companies and Spanish Fork City wherein and 
whereby it was agreed that plaintiff, East Bench Canal 
Company, should be entitled to a flow of 95 cubic feet 
per second, defendant Salem Canal & Irrigation Com-
pany to a flow of 55 cubic feet per second, Spanish Fork 
South Irrigation Company to a flow of 75 cubic feet 
per second, Lake Shore Irrigation Company to a flow 
of 60 cubic feet per second, and defendants, Spanish 
Fork City and Spanish Fork Southeast Irrigation Com-
pany, and plaintiff Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation 
Company to a flow through the Mill Race of 105 cubic 
feet per second. That such rights consisting of a total 
flow of 390 cubic feet per second were by such Con-
tracts admitted to be superior to any rights acquired 
by the defendant United States on account of the cer-
tificates issued to it pursuant to the filing made by it 
as hereinbefore alleged." 
By paragraph 15 of the Answer of defendant United 
States, the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner 
of the Bureau of Reclamation, it is alleged: "Admits paragraph 
25 except for the last sentence thereof which is denied" (R. 
169. 
In paragraph 16 of the Answer of defendants Strawberry 
Water Users, et al., the allegations of paragraph 25 are ad-
mitted except if any Company is unable to beneficially use 
the amount of water mentioned in paragraph 25, such Com-
pany may not transfer the same to another Company (R. 99). 
No attempt was made to amend the pleadings above mentioned 
until quite some time after plaintiff had rested, which occurred 
on January 8, 1957. See Transcript 197. In the Answer of the 
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State Engineer paragraph 25 of the Petition is admitted. It 
was not until nuine~ous witnesses were called by the: defendants 
and various Exhibits had been offered and received . that the 
defendants sought, and the Trial Court granted them, leave 
to amend. See Tninsctipt 425. Upon leave .being granted the 
defendant~ d~nied paragraph 25 of plaintiff's Petition. It 
was then that .Counsel for defendants, other than the United 
States and its officers, withdrew as Counsel for some of the 
defendants (Tr. 447-457). 
It will be seen that 228 pages of testimony of defendants' 
wi,tnesses were taken after plaintiff rested before the defendants 
sought leave to amend and leave was granted over objection 
q£. plaintiff. After the amendment was made plaintiff asked· 
and was granted leave to amend paragraph 25 of the Petition 
by striking out the words "certificates issued" and substituting 
therefore "filings made" (Tr. 435). The plaintiffs were also 
granted leave to reopen the case. The attention of the Court 
was called to the following language contained in the various 
contracts of those who had established water rights in Spanish 
Fork River: 
"the Company (Spanish Fork South Irrigation Com-
pany) may divert from the flow of Spanish Fork River 
such an amount of water as it is entitled to under: 
A. a decree of the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah dated April 20, 1899, rendered by Judge W. 
M. McCarthy; and 
B. decree of the same court dated January 1, 1901, 
rendered by John E. Booth, and subsequent appropria-
tions through prescriptive rights. 
The total amount of said water diverted at one time 
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not to exceed 75 .second feet, and the company so far 
as its rights and interest are concerned will permit the 
United States to take all other waters of Spanish Fork 
River without interference." (Tr. 438) 
Similar provisions were contained in other contracts except 
that the amount of water is that heretofore specified, namely: 
105 second feet in the Mill race,, 95 second feet in the canal 
of the East Bench; 55 second feet in the Salem Canal and 60 
second feet in the Lake Shore Canal. The Court having per-
mitted plaintiffs to reopen they called Wayne Francis, the 
Water Commissioner, who testified that he had been Water 
Commissioner on Spanish Fork River since 1941 (Tr. 408); 
that at all times since he had been such Commissioner no one 
purporting to represent the United States had questioned the 
right of the old water users of Spanish Fork River to a prior 
right of 390 second feet (Tr. 459, 461). That was also the 
testimony of Robert E. Huber, the Secretary of defendant 
Water Users Association (Tr. 463-467), and of Arthur W. 
Finley, a director of defendant Water Users Association (Tr. 
468-472). There is no evidence to the contrary. Mr. Leo M. 
Banks was called as a witness by plaintiff and testified that he 
is an officer of plaintiff West Field Irrigation Company (Tr. 
526); that the various companies who are the owners of 
water rights in Spanish Fork River have beneficially used the 
390 cubic feet per second whenever the same is available (Tr. 
530). The testimony of Lawrence E. Johnson (Tr. 532), is 
to the same effect, so also is the testimony of Joseph Hanson 
(Tr. 538). 
In the statement of the case on behalf of defendant Straw-
berry Water Users Association, et al., mention is made of the 
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fact that there are sixteen members of the Board of Directors 
of defendant Strawberry Water Users, but attention is not 
called to the fact that a majority of such directors are sub-
scribers for water deliverable through the defendant Straw-
berry High Line Canal Company. It is, however, so alleged 
ih paragraph 39 of the Petition (R. 17). In paragraph 27 
of the Answer of defendants Strawberry Water Users Asso-
ciation, et al., it is admitted that a majority of the board of 
directors of said defendant Association are subscribers for 
water deliverable through the Starwberry High ·Line Canal 
(R. 101). While in the Answer of the United States, et aL, 
they deny the allegations of paragraph 39 of the Petition 
for lack of information, the trial court found the allegations 
of paragraph 39 to be true in its finding No. 41 (R. 429). 
No attack is made upon that Finding. . 
Moreover, at the commencement of the trial, Counsel for 
defendants Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., ex-
pressly admitted the allegations of paragraph 39 of the Petition, 
and Council for the United States stated that he won't make 
an issue of the allegations of paragraph 39 (Tr. 14). 
The decree entered in this cause, paragraph 13, (R. 446), 
provides: 
"That in light of the fact that the quantity of water 
in Spanish Fork River to which the United States and 
its successors in interest have the right to the use 
thereof varies during different years and during differ-
ent seasons of the same year, the Court has deemed it 
proper and necessary to make and does make the fol-' 
lowing provisions of the manner in which the waters 
of the project shall be regulated and distributed during 
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the next ten years after the entry of this decision as 
follows: 
That all water users shall be charged in full for all 
stored water and for all project river water used during 
periods when reservoir water is being released. 
;~ ;. 'l 
That ,in any calendar year when the project supply 
will probably not be sufficient to furnish the holders 
of approved applications 100 per cent of the amount 
of water applied for and approved under their appli-
cations, then all users of project water shall be charged 
in full for such water used after May 1st and 30 per 
cent for water used prior to May 1st. 
That in any calendar year when the project supply 
will probably be sufficient to furnish 100 per cent or 
more of project water covered by their approved ap-
plications, then users of project river water shall be 
charged as follows: 
.... 
(a) For water received prior to May 1st when water 
is not being released from the reservoir 20 per cent; 
(b) For water received between May 1st and May 
31st when water is not being released from the reser-
voir 50 per cent; 
(c) For water received after May 31st 100 per cent. 
The term "project river water" as herein used refers 
to water from Spanish Fork River available under the 
appropriations made by the United States on the flow 
of Spanish Fork River." 
By paragraph 14 of the Decree it is provided that the 
State Engineer of Utah is directed to make an announcement 
on or before April 1st of each year an estimate as to whether 
or not the supply of water from the project will be sufficient 
for the ensuing irrigation season to furnish all holders of 
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approved applications -100 per cent of water applied for and 
approved under the approved applications, such estimate shall 
be made by said State . Engineer from such information as 
he shall deem to be reliable and adequate. The estimate made 
by the State Engineer shall not affect the right of the Directors 
of the Strawberry Water Users Association to make their own 
independent determination as to the available water supply 
for the purpose of administering the project, but shall be I 
binding upon the Board as to the percentage charges to be j 
made for the use of project river water as hereinbefore directed j 
unless and until the same is upon good cause shown to be 
improper and ordered changed by the Court. 
POINT VIII 
THE DECREE OF THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY 
INTERPRETED THE WATER RIGHT APPLICATIONS 
AND ERRED IN FAILING TO SO CONSTRUE THE SAME 
SO THAT EACH APPLICANT FOR THE PURCHASE OF 
WATER SHOULD BE CHARGED WITH THE FULL 
AMOUNT OF WATER USED. 
In discussing Point I of the points raised by defendants 
Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., it is pointed out 
that the trial court in substance concluded: 
" ( 1) That the high water of Spanish Fork River con-
stituted part of the Stra\vberry Project. Conclu-
sion 12). 
( 2) That in the management and operation of the 
project the Strawberry Water Users Association 
does not have the right to distribute the high 
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waters of Spanish Fork River without charging 
the users thereof. (Conclusion 14) .. 
( 3) That the charge to be made should be adequate 
to properly protect the rights of the other users 
under the project. (Conclusion 15). 
If the trial court had stopped there, defendants 
would have no real quarrel with those conclusions with 
some reservations." 
The Court was clearly right in its above mentioned Con-
clusion No. 1. See Exhibit 1. 
Finding No. 34 of the Trial Court shows that on February 
4, 1909, defendant United States by its Bureau of Reclamation 
filed an application with the State Engineer of Utah to appro-
priate 390 cubic feet of the unappropriated water of Spanish 
Fork River to be used to irrigate 19,907.83 acres of land. The 
lands particularly described in the application are located in 
the southerly end of Utah County, Utah. That a Certification 
of Appropriation has been issued for the water applied for. 
These lands are irrigated through the Strawberry High Line 
Canal. 
As to the above mentioned Conclusion No. 2 (Conclusion 
14), (R. 446), plaintiffs are in accord with the same and 
claim that the charge should be for the full amount of water 
used. 
As to the above mentioned Conclusion No. 3 (Con-
clusion 15), (R. 447), plaintiffs claim that a full charge for 
water used is necessary to protect the rights of the other water 
users under the project, and that each water user has only 
such rights as are granted to him by his Contract. 
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As to the above mentioned Conclusion No. 4 (Conclu-
sion 16), (R. 447}, plaintiffs claim that this action was brought 
and prosecuted for the purpose of construing Contracts, and 
it is immaterial whether or not water is lost to the project. 
If it is lost to the project, it may be beneficially used by other 
applicants. Indeed, this Court judicially knows that other 
claims are being made to the waters lost to the project. Salt 
Lake City, et al. v. Anderson, et al., 106 Utah 350, 148 Pac. 
(2d) 346. 
On page 26 of the Brief of Strawberry Water Users Asso-
ciation mention is made of there being approximately a total 
of 717 contracts under the Strawberry High Line Canal, and 
that such Contracts are of nine different forms. The fact that 
there are nine different forms of contracts for the purchase 
of water deliverable through the High Line Canal cannot be 
said to. be material in this case. Neither under the pleadings 
nor the evidence in this case is there any controversy between 
the various owners of water right contracts represented by 
shares of stock in defendant High Line Canal Company. 
In paragraph 38, (R. 16), of the Petition for a Declaratory 
Judgment it is alleged that the number of acre feet of water 
p~rchased from the United States, which are annually deliver-
able through the Strawberry High Line Canal, are 40,377.25 
acre feet. It is so found in Finding No. 39 of the Court's Find-
ings (R. 428). It was so testified to by Robert E. Huber, the 
Secretary of defendant Strawberry Water Users Association, 
with this qualification, that if an individual who had an appli-
cation for wtaer under the High Line Unit had not paid his 
assessment, the number of acre feet for which he had filed 
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an application would not be included in the figure showing 
the acre feet of water deliverable through the High Line 
Canal (Tr. 179). 
This controversy is not as to the amount of water purchased 
by each owner of stock in the High Line Canal, but as to the 
total amount of water that such stockholders are entitled to 
receive thn;mgh that canal. A finding as to the acre feet of 
water that each stockholder owned in the High Line Canal 
would not aid _in resolving this controversy, but would make 
needless voluminous Findings, Conclusions and Decree. 
On page 28· of the Brief of Appellant Strawberry Water 
Users Association the attention of the Court is called to certain 
Findings, Conclusions and evidence to the effect that the flow 
of water in Spanish Fork River is less valuable than storage 
water. It is true that those who bought storage water were 
required to pay therefor at the rate of $45.00 per acre foot, 
while those who purchased part storage water and part river 
water were required to pay only $80.00 per acre of irrigable 
land which entitled them to two acre feet per annum, and 
in addition to that, those whose lands were irrigated through 
the High Line Canal had such canal constructed with money 
chargeable against the entire project, including those who were 
required to pay $45.00 per acre foot. Those who were required 
to pay $45.00 per acre foot were required to furnish their 
own means of conveying water from Spanish Fork River to 
their lands. See Finding No. 31 (R. 425). River water is 
generally available in the early season in larger quantities. 
That later the value of water for irrigation entirely depends 
on the need of the crops growing on the land to be irrigated. 
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The situation is well explained by Elmer Jacob, an engineer 
of many years of experience in the use of water for irrigation 
(Trs. 510, 511 ~nd 521, et seq.) Be that as it may, it would 
be a novel and so far as· we are able to ascertain an unwarranted 
basis for a determination of the extent of a water right pur-
chased by a written contract to engage in a speculation as 
to the relative value of early and late water. Water put to a 
beneficial use is the basis of the right without regard to 
whether it is for early or late irrigation. 
There is another somewhat novel argument made on page 
29 of the Brief of Strawberry Water Users Association, namely: 
that the defendant "Association must dispose of such high 
water at whatever partial charge those who can use it will 
accept when it is available, otherwise such water will flow 
into Utah Lake," etc. 
We have no quarrel with the doctrine announced in the 
case of Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union Central 
Life Ins. Co., 142 Pac. (2d) 866, 105 Utah 468, where it is 
held that if one stockholder of a company has no use for water, 
some other stockholder may use the same. Indeed, if no 
stockholder of a corporation or other owner has use for water, 
a stranger may doubtless use the same. However, that is not 
this case. The clear effect of the manner in which the Board 
of Directors of defendant Strawberry Water Users Association 
has been regulating the waters of the project, especially during 
recent years, is to take water from those who have purchased 
stored water and give it to those \vho have purchased both 
stored and river water. If the water users under the High Line 
Canal are charged with all of the river water used by them, 
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it necesa.rily follows that they will be entitled to less of the 
stored water. To illustrate. Assume a water user under the 
High Line Canal is the owner of one hundred acres of land 
for which he is entitled to two hundred acre feet of water 
under his contract for the pur~pase of a water right from the 
United States. Assume further that he uses 100 acre feet of 
river water and he is only charged with 50 acre feet. He would 
then be entitled to 150 acre feet of stored water, whereas, if 
he were charged with the full amount of the river water used, 
he would be entitled to only 100 acre feet of stored water. 
Under the assumed facts the stored water would be depleted 
50 acre feet, and all of the owners of a right to the stored 
water would stand ·the loss. It does require a mathematical 
genius to figure out such results. But it is said that if the pur-
chasers of water available through the High Line Canal are 
charged in full for the water used by them, they will use less 
river water and more stored water. Assuming that to be so, 
does that fact justify only a partial charge for the river water 
used by those who have a water right deliverable through the 
High Line Canal ? There is no language in any of the contracts 
of those whose water is deliverable through the High Line 
Canal that they may have the use of any river water without 
being charged for all that is used. Most of the contracts for 
water deliverable through the High Line Canal provide that: 
"The quantitative measure of water right hereby 
applied for is that quantity of water which shall be 
beneficially used for the irrigation of said irrigable 
land up to, but not exceeding two ( 2) acre feet per acre 
per anum, measured at the head of Strawberry High 
Line Canal, and in no case exceeding the share pro-
portionate to irrigable acreage of the water supply 
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actually available as determineci by the Project Man-
ager or other proper officer of the United States, or its 
successor, in the control of the project during the irri-
gation season for the irrigation of the lands under said 
unit." 
It is so alleged in the Petition, paragraph 29, (R. 12), 
admitted in the Answer of defendant Strawberry Water Users 
Association (R. 99), and in the Answer of the United States 
(R. 109). It is also shown by Exhibit-PHs. Ex. 8, and found 
by the trial court, Finding 30, (R. 425). As heretofore stated 
the pleadings, the evidence and the decree also show that the 
total number of acre feet required to fully supply those who 
had contracts for water deliverable through the High Line 
Canal is 40,377.26 acre feet per annum. Some of those con-
tracts provided for 3 acre feet per annum, and some were silent : 
as to the quantity of water covered by the Contracts, but 
as above stated the pleadings, the evidence, and the Findings 
all show the total number of acre feet deliverable annually 
to those owning water under the High Line Canal. That being 
so no useful purpose would be served by making a list of 
the 71 7 purchasers of a water right under that Canal. 
In the Brief of defendants Strawberry Water Users Asso-
ciation, et al., attention is called to the fact that in the Con-
tracts dealing with the sale of water to the purchasers of a 
water right deliverable through the old established irrigation 
systems referred to as 'the Spanish Fork Unit, it is provided 
that: 
"The said water shall be delivered in Spanish Fork 
River at the head of the . . . . . . during the months 
of May to September, inclusive, at such a rate of de-
livery as the water right applicant may desire, insofar 
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as such rate may be feasible, as determined by the 
United States, but in no event at a rate of flow per 
month greater than 40 per cent of the total annual 
supply in a flow as nearly uniform as practicable unless 
otherwise mutually agreed." 
No such provision is contained in the Contracts for the purchase 
of water deliverable through the High Line Canal, but such 
Contracts do provide that not to exceed 2 acre feet_ shall be 
delivered annually during the irrigation season. It is clear that 
the reason for this difference in the language is that it was 
contemplated that the purchasers of water whose land was 
under the old established irrigation systems would receive 
stored water which was to be conveyed through a tunnel which 
was limited in carrying capacity, and that those who already 
had a water right in Spanish Fork River were supplied with 
early water or could arrange to exchange water with those 
who had a water right in Spanish Fork River. It will further 
be noted that the Contracts with those whose water was to 
be delivered through the established systems were to have the 
water delivered into Spanish Fork River. On the other hand, 
the river water purchased from the United States could not 
be said to be delivered into Spanish Fork River by the United 
States because it was already there. To say that the early 
water delivered into the High Line Canal for use in the irri-
gation of the lands under that Canal was not delivered during 
the irrigtaion season fails to make sense. An irrigation season 
must mean the time people irrigated. The United States made 
its filing on the waters of Spanish Fork River to be used for 
the irrigation of the lands described in the application from 
March 1st to November 1st. See Plfs. Ex. 1, and Plfs. Ex. 2. 
That is the land under the High Line Canal. 
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It is said on page 29 of the Brief of the Strawberry Water 
Users Association, et al., that the users of water under the 
High Line Canal are in a "bargaining position. They do not 
particularly want the water but will take it at a partial charge." 
We digress to observe that the practice of coaxing farmers to 
use more water is certainly an innovation in the use of water 
in this and other western states. The aim is and has been to 
secure a reduction in the use of water, not to induce farmers 
to use more water. If the Contracts which plaintiffs seek to 
have construed mean anything, they mean that the period of 
bargaining was at the time the Contracts were signed. Those 
who desired to purchase more than 2 acre feet were permitted 
to do so. See Tr. 180. Some of those who did not purchase 
all the water they desired were permitted to purchase addi-
tional water even after the operation of the project was taken 
over by the Strawberry Water Users Association '(Tr. 1,58). 
During the trial and in the Brief of defendants the claim 
is stressed that by the practice of allowing those who receive 
water through the High Line Canal to be charged only for 
a part, if any, of the water used, will result in preserving some 
of the stored water and result in a benefit to the entire project. 
It will be seen that those who have water rights deliverable 
through the High Line Canal are entitled to 40,377.26 acre 
feet per annum, and that the total number of acre feet pur-
chased in the project is 70,780.32 acre feet per annum. Thus 
the quantity of water deliverable through the High Line Canal 
is substantially 4/7 of the total amount of water purchased 
in the project. Thus, if any of the river water is allowed to 
run into Utah Lake, the water users under the High Line Canal 
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will stand to lose at least 4/7ths of the water so permitted to 
run into Utah Lake, that is to say, if instead of using river 
water they use stored water, the amount of their stored water 
will be reduced to the extent that they could have beneficially 
used river water. It is doubtful if any such results will follow 
by a practice of charging all purchasers of a water right with 
the full amount of the water actually used, whether it be river 
water or stored water. In any event there is no language in any 
of the Contracts which may be said to give the Board of 
Directors of the defendant Association authority to make only 
a partial charge for water use. The provision of the Contracts 
for the purchase of water is to the contrary. It is provided in 
the Contracts of both the High Line Unit and the Spanish 
Fork Unit that the water delivered to any purchasers of water 
shall: 
tn no case exceed the share proportionate to the 
irrigable acreage of the water supply actually available 
as determined by the Project Manager, or other proper 
officer of the United States, or its successor, in the 
control of the project, during the irrigation season for 
the irrigation of lands under said Unit." 
The practice followed by the Board of Directors of defendant 
Association, which its Counsel seek to have the Court approve, 
is at war with such provision. 
It is further argued by Counsel for the defendant Asso-
ciation that its Board of Directors have a right to do as it 
pleases with the water entrusted to its control. That neither 
the stockholders of the Association nor the courts may interfere 
with the manner in which the Board of Directors of defendant 
control the waters of the project. On page 33 of defendant 
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Association's, et al., Brief cases are cited which it is claimed 
support such view. Such claim is without support in law for 
two reasons, they being: 1st. A substantial number of pur-
chasers of water rights under the project who are not.· stock-
holders in the defendant Association; 2nd. The Board of 
Directors of the defendant Association must recognize and 
protect the rights of each stockholder as fixed by his Contract 
of Purchase. The evidence shows· without conflict that only 
about 82% of the purchasers of water under the project are 
members of defendant Association (Tr. 65). To prevent the 
defendant Association from permitting the stockholders of 
the High Line Canal to use more water than their Contracts 
call for will result in depriving other purchasers of water 
who are not stockholders of the defendant Association, is 
not an interference with the internal affairs of the Association, 
but a determination by the Court that the Association must 
so control and distribute the water under its control so that 
each owner of water right shall receive the amount of water 
to which he is entitled, which in this case means the water 
that he has purchased as provided for in his Contract of 
Purchase. As to the duty of a corporation engaged in the 
control of the water evidenced by certificates issued to its 
stockholders the law is well settled in this and other juris-
dictions, that the Company must distribute the amount of 
water to each stockholder to which he is entitled. If the Com-
pany fails to do so the Court will direct that the same be done. 
See Yardley v. Long Canal, 177 Pac. (2d) 530; Burtenshaw 
z;. Bountiful Irrigation Co., 90 Utah 196, 61 Pac. (2d) 312; 
Baird v. Upper Canal Irr. Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 Pac. 1060; 
Genola Town Z'. Santt~qttin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 Pac. (2d) 930. 
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The evidence in this case conclusively shows that. the 
manner in which the Board of Directors of defendant Asso-
ciation has been distributing and seek to control the -water 
of the Federal Project here involved is contrary to the law 
announced in the foregoing cases. 
A number of exhibits were received in evidence showing 
the amount of project river and stored water delivered to the 
various corporations which are parties to this action during 
the period that the project has been in operation. Referring 
to Defendants' Exhibit 73, which contains the same informa-
tion as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 69, these facts are made to appear. 
During the period extending from the time water of the 
project was first used up to and including 1931 there was 
sufficient water to fully supply the amount of water applied 
for in the various Contracts of Purchase. For a period of five 
years, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932 and 1933, an arrangement was 
had between those who received their project water through the 
old established irrigation systems and the newly constructed 
High Line Canal whereby the High Line Canal should be 
charged with 5000 acre feet per annum for the river water used 
by its stockholders without regard to the amount of river 
water so used. This arrangement was abandoned in 1934 
because much less than 5000 acre feet of river water was 
available. See Finding numbered 43. See also Minutes of the 
Strawberry Water Users Association meeting held on February 
18, 1929, marked as page 5 of the meeting of that date, which 
is a part of Defendants' Exhibit 83. After the arrangement 
dealing with the charge to be made the High Line Canal for 
river water was abandoned other attempts were made to come 
to an agreement with respect to the charges to be made for 
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the use of river water. See Defendants' Exhibit· 8. But no 
further arrangement was had. Since 1933 the Board of, Directors 
of defendant Association has from time to tiriie fixed the 
charges that have been made for river water used by the stock-
holders of the High Line Canal. Exhibits ·69 and 73 above 
mentioned show that in 1932 the High Line Canal used 13,425 
acre feet of river water for which they were charged the 
agreed amount of 5000 acre feet; that in 1933 the High Line 
Canal used 13,129 acre feet of river water for which the agreed 
charge of 5000 acre feet was made. It will be seen that in 1932 
there was sufficient water to supply only 35% of the water 
provided in the Contracts for the purchase of project water, 
and in 1933 only 76% of the water provided in the Contract 
for the purchase of water. After the arrangement for making 
a definite charge of 5000 acre feet for river water used by the 
stockholders of the High Line Canal, the amount of water used, 
the· amount charged and the percentage of water available 
for the subscribers of water was as follows: 
Year Amount Used By Amount Charged Amount of 
High Line High Line Water 
Canal Canal Available 
1934 13,996 5,146 70 
1934 3,996 89 35 
1935 11,176 5,146 70 
1936 17,326 4,146 80 
1937 16,132 5,512 85 
1938 11,462 4,880 90 
1939 1,123 0 100 
1940 9,235 1,524 80 
1941 10,708 4,543 80 
1942 9,539 348 80 
1943 4,107 352 85 
1944 11,235 0 80 
1945 7,671 859 90 
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During the next ten years the High Line. Canal used sub-
stantially•more water than was charged against it, but sufficient 
water was made available to supply the full amount of water 
that was contracted for. It will be observed that during some 
years the report shows that water was wasted. A statement 
of the years in which the water was wasted will be found at 
the bottom of Defendants' Exhibit 73. 
Mr. Elmer Jacob, a graduate of the University of Wis-
consin, (Tr. 66), and with more than 30 years experience in 
connection with the operation of irrigation projects, (Tr. 67), 
testified that if all the project water that was delivered into 
the various canal systems had been charged to the water users 
under such canals from and after 1935, there would have been 
sufficient project water to fully supply all of the water pur-
chased (Tr. 78-79). 
The Trial Court made this Finding, the accuracy of which 
is not questioned: 
"52. That in thirteen years between 1932 and 1952 the 
supply of water under the project was insufficient 
to supply water users with the full amount of water 
applied for by them. That the average percentage 
received by all water users under the project in said 
thirteen years was 78.15 per cent of the amount 
applied for. 
"53. That during said thirteen years the amount of 
water diverted from Spanish Fork River for use as 
project water averaged 10,609 acre feet annually 
and the average charge made therefor was 26.76 
per cent of the amount received. 
"54. That during the period from 1919 to 1938, both 
inclusive, it apears that an average of 9310 acre 
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feet of water was diverted annually from Spanish 
Fork River for use as project water, and that the 
rate of charge therefor during said period was 
46.4 per cent of the volume used. That during the 
period from 1939 to 1955, both inclusive, the 
average diversion of water from the river for use 
as project wtaer was 6,940 acre feet, and the 
average rate of charge therefor was 15.5 per cent 
of the volume used. (See Defendants' Exhibits 
69 and 73). 
It will be seen from the Exhibits, and also from the Find-
ings of the Court, that as water in the project be<:ame less the 
percentage of charge made for river water delivered to the users 
of water under the High Line Canal became less. 
The right to the use of water is a vested right which is 
recognized and confirmed by Article XVII, Section 1, of the 
Constitution of Utah, and the authorities generally. Skinner 
v. Jordan Valley Irr. Dist., 300 Pac. 336,27 Idaho 643. It is 
also the established law that a member of a Board of Directors ,) 
may not vote in matters where he has a personal interest. 19 
C.J.S., page 94, Sec. 749c, and cases cited in foot notes. Article 
XI of the Articles of Incorporation of the defendant Straw" 
berry Water Users Association provides that a majority of the 
members of the Board of Directors shall constitute a quorum 
and as such authorized to exercise the corporate powers of the 
Corporation. See plaintiffs' Exhibit 13. If the nine members 
who are owners of and represent water rights under the High 
Line Canal may determine the charges that shall be made 
for river water deliverable through the High Line Canal, they 
are not only ignoring the express provisions of the Contracts 
for the purchase of water rights, but are depriving those who 
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own water deliverable through the old irrigation systems of 
a part of the water right purchased by them. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN FIXING THE PER-
CENTAGE THAT SHOULD BE CHARGED FOR RIVER 
WATER AND THAT SUCH ERROR WAS PREJUDICIAL 
TO THE RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENTS. 
What we have said as to Point I of the Brief of the 
Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., is applicable to 
Point II thereof. We shall not repeat what we have heretofore 
said in answer to Point I. It is said that the best interest of 
the project as a whole will be furthered by permitting the 
Board of Directors of the Strawberry Water Users Association 
to dispose of the water of the project as they see fit. There are 
those who believe that it would be to the best interest of the 
people of a county as a whole to let some one determine and 
:fix the amount of property or income that each person should 
receive. We have not yet adopted such a doctrine. We are 
still governed by the law that the water rights of the indi-
- vidual are entitled to protection. So also are contracts, which 
provide for the amount of water that a purchaser shall receive, 
valid and enforceable. The majority of the Board of Directors 
of Strawberry Water Users Association are powerless to impair 
such contracts. That may not be done even by the Legislative 
Branch of Government. Sec. 10, Article I of the Constitution 
of the United States, Sec. 18, Article I of the Constitution of 
Utah. 
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It may be argued that if those who receive their water 
through the old irrigation systems are given the amount of 
water that they have purchased, they have no just cause to 
complain. During a period of 13 years they did not receive 
the water purchased. According to the testimony of Mr. Jacob 
this shortage was brought about because more water was given 
to the users of water under the High Line Canal than was 
called for by the Contracts for water deliverable through that 
Canal. That much of said shortage was caused by such practice 
is not open to doubt, especially during dry seasons. If there are 
some water users who have failed to purchase sufficient water, 
and if, as defendants claim, there is still water available for 
sale, it would seem that the only way that such water can 
legally be disposed of is by the sale thereof. By that means the 
cost of paying for the project will be borne by those who receive 
the water and in proportion to the benefits derived from the 
project. For those who have purchased 3 acre feet of water 
to pay the full purchase price thereof and to supply others 
with water for only a part of what they use, is not only wrong 
but is in direct conflict with the Contracts which Respondents 
seek to have construed. 
POINT X 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE CONTRACTS PROVIDE THAT CHARGE SHALL BE 
MADE FOR WATER DELIVERED PRIOR TO MAY 1st. 
Under Point III, pages 41 to 46 of the Brief of defendants 
Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., it is argued that 
because the Contract with the High Line Canal provides that 
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water will be delivered during the ~irrigation season of May 
1st to October 1st of each year in accordance with the terms of 
existing Contracts, such language does not say that no charge 
at all should be made for water prior to May 1st. Counsel 
fails to inform the Court as to what is to be done with the 
language of .the contracts, with the individual purchasers which 
provides that not to exceed 2 acre feet per annum shall be used 
by the purchaser. Nor is any attempt made to explain away 
the undisputed fact that there are 40,377.26 acre feet deliver-
able through the High Line Canal per annum. Nor does he 
explain away the fact that everyone connected with the project 
have, ever since the project was in operation, understood that 
at least some charge should be made for water delivered to the 
water users under the High Line Canal prior to May 1st. 
· The language above mentioned does not say that the 
irrigation season is limited to the period of May 1st to October 
1st of each year. It merely says that "during the irrigation 
season of May 1 to October 1· of each year." The only water 
that may be said to be delivered is the stored water. The river 
water is not under the control of anyone except the River 
Commissioner. There is no occasion to limit the quantity of 
water that may be called for to 18% in May and not to exceed 
27Yz% in any one month as to the river water. It is obvious 
that these provisions of the Contract apply only to the stored 
water. The tunnel that carries the water through the mountain 
from the reservoir to the headwaters of Spanish Fork River 
has a limited carrying capacity, hence the necessity ot" requiring 
a uniform flow and limiting the amount that is called for in 
any one month. It was apparently believed, and in the main 
correctly believed, that the flow of Spanish Fork River would 
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supply the needs of all of the purchasers of water prior to 
May 1st. To say that the irrigation season did not begin until 
May 1st would fly in the face of the very foundation of the 
right of the United States and its purchasers of a water right, 
namely: the application to file upon the water of Spanish 
Fork River for the irrigation of lands under the High Line 
Canal from March 1st to November 1st. (See Plfs. Ex. 1, and 
Certificate of Appropriation, Plfs. Ex. 2). 
POINT XI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FIXING THE 
EXTENT OF THE OLD ESTABLISHED RIGHTS IN SPAN-
ISH FORK RIVER. 
The Declaratory Judgments Act, U.C.A. 1953, 78-33-11, 
provides that "all persons shall be made parties who have or 
claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration." 
The established water rights on Spanish Fork River were of 
necessity affected by the declaration of rights to the waters of 
Spanish Fork River. Without a determination of the estab-
lished rights of the old Companies as to the nature and extent 
of such right, it could not be determined the nature and extent, 
if any, of the rights acquired by the United States under its 
filings. Moreover, the old irrigation systems were obligated 
to deliver water purchased from the United States to various 
purchasers whose land was under the established irrigation 
systems. 
As will be seen from what has heretofore been said, it 
was only near the close of the trial that the defendants sought 
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to claim that the various old established rights did not amount 
to 390 second feet. There is no evidence that such rights are 
limited to 243 second feet, or any amount less than 390 cubic 
feet. Mention is made of adverse use. The claims of the old 
Companies to the water of Spanish Fork River are not based 
upon adverse use. The claims are made as prior appropriation 
and the admission of the United States that such claims are 
prior to the applications made by the United States. 
ANSWER TO BRIEF OF THE STATE ENGINEER 
The Brief of the State Engineer states One Point and Five 
subdivisions thereof upon which he relies for a reversal of the 
Judgment. Much of what has been said in answer to the points 
relied upon by the United States, et al., and the Strawberry 
Water Users Association, et al., is applicable to the points 
relied upon by the State Engineer. 
POINT XII 
IT IS TRUE THAT THERE WAS NO ISSUE AS TO 
THE RIGHTS OF THE ESTABLISHED IRRIGATION 
COMPANIES. 
In paragraph 25 of the Petition it is alleged that the 
various canals of the established irrigation companies were 
filled with water from Spanish Fork River, and it was agreed 
that plaintiff East Bench should have 95, Salem Canal & Irri-
gation Company 55 cubic feet, Spanish Fork South Irrigation 
Company 75 cubic feet, Lake Shore Irrigation Company 60 
cubic feet, Spanish Fork City, Spanish Fork Southeast Irriga-
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tion Company and Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Com-
pany 105 cubic feet per second, a total of 390 cubic feet per 
second (R. 11) . 
In paragraph 1 of the Answer of the State Engineer para-
graphs 1 to 29 are admitted.. . 
There was thus no issue as to the amount of prior water 
right owned by various established water rights on Spanish 
Fork River because it was alleged by the plaintiffs and admitted 
by the State Engineer. 
POINT XIII 
ALL OF THE PARTIES NECESSARY TO AN ADJUDI-
CATION OF THIS CONTROVERSY WERE BEFORE THE 
COURT. 
This action was brought to secure a construction of the 
Contracts for the purchase of water from the United States. 
The only persons who were interested in that controversy were 
those who had Contracts with the United States touching the 
water filed upon by the United States. It would have been idle 
to have brought in all of the parties involved in the case of 
Salt Lake City v. Anderson, et al. That case has been pending 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County for more than 20 
years, and apparently no nearer settlement than it was 20 
years ago. Under such circumstances the doctrine announced 
in such cases as Matchellz·. Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation 
Co., 1 Utah (2d) 313, 265 Pac. (2d) 1016, is especially ap-
plicable here. The people interested in this controversy should 
have the same settled during their lifetime and thus avoid the 
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loss that will be sustained ·by them throughout their li~etime. 
Moreover, the State Engineer did not timely raise the question 
of another action pending in his Answer. We have discussed 
the other questions raised by defendant, State Engineer. In an 
Answer to the Brief of the United States, et al., and the Brief 
of the Strawberry Water Users Association, et al., and shall 
not enlarge upon what is there said. 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FILED A NOTICE OF 
CROSS-APPEAL AND THEY RELY UPON THE FOLLOW-
ING POINTS IN SUPPORT THEREOF. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RENDER 
A DECREE WHEREIN AND WHEREBY THE CON-
TRACTS FOR WATER DELIVERABLE THROUGH THE 
HIGH LINE CANAL ARE CHARGEABLE WITH ALL 
THE WATER THEY USE. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RETAINING JURIS-
DICTION OF THIS CAUSE FOR A PERIOD OF TEN 
YEARS. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TOREN-
DER A DECREE WHEREIN AND WHEREBY THE CON-
TRACTS FOR WATER DELIVERABLE THOUGH THE 
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HIGH LINE CANAL ARE CHARGEABLE WITH ALL THE 
WATER THEY USE. 
It will be seen that there are a great number of Exhibits 
which were reueived in evidence. During the trial we were dt 
a loss to understand upon which possible the9ry many of the 
Exhibits were competent. The issues raised by the pleading~ 
were confined to the construction that should be placed ~n 
the various Contracts for the sale of water under the Federal 
Strawberry Project, and such other Contracts as were entered 
into by the United States Government and the Corporations 
that were to distribute the water right applied for to the 
persons entitled thereto. It would seem to need no argument 
to convince this Court that contracts are made to be carried 
out according to the intention of the parties thereto as shown 
by the language used. It is when, and only when, the language 
~ used in a contract is ambiguous or uncertain that resort may 
.be had to construction. If the language of a contract is certain 
and definite, there is nothing to construe. 12 Am. fur. 228, 
and cases cited in footnotes. We have heretofore discussed the 
·meaning of the Contracts here involved and shall not enlarge 
upon what is there said. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RETAINING JURIS-
DICTION OF THIS CAUSE FOR A PERIOD OF TEN 
YEARS. 
The project here involved had been in operation for a 
period of 44 years prior to the time of the trial. Water was first 
· delivered in 1913. See Defendants' Exhibit 73. Complete 
records were kept of the water available to supply those who 
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had purchased water from the United States during all of that 
period. If that is not a sufficient time to ·ascertain all relevant 
facts, an additional ten years cannot accomplish that purpose. 
Moreover, the meaning of the various Contracts here involved 
will not change in an additional ten years, notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court of the United States is accused of changing 
the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. In the 
course of an additional ten years it is more than likely that 
a number of us who have taken part in this litigation will have 
passed to the Great Beyond, and any evidence that may be now 
available will be gone. Further, as to that. The cost of this 
litigation, which is incurred by the Strawberry Water Users 
Association Users Association, many of whom are the owners 
of only stored water, and as such are interested in having the 
users of river water charged with all the water they use from 
that source. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs herein claim that all those who use project 
water, whether it be river water or stored water, should be 
charged with all of the water used. That such is the · clear 
meaning of the Contracts here involved, and that a Final Decree 
should be entered herein at this time to avoid needless further 
delay, and to put an end to further litigation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
Respondents and Cross-Appellants 
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